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MISTAKE IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
UNILATERAL PALPABLE AND IMPALPABLE MIS-
TAKE IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS1
By BENEDICT I. LUBELL*
I. IN THE COURTS
M ISTAK.E in the formation of a bid on construction contracts
I has been urged as the basis for relief in a number of
varied situations which have come before the courts. Faulty
addition,2 misreading of blueprints,3 omission of items,' trans-
position of numbers,5 improper multiplication," misunderstanding
as to location, 7 or extent of the work demanded,8 constitute the
*Senior in the School of Law, Columbia University, New York City.
'This article constitutes an elaboration of one of the mistake situations
discussed in Patterson, Equitable Relief for Unilateral Mistake, (1928)
28 Col. L. Rev. 859. The present writer is greatly indebted to Pro-
fessor Patterson for his kind assistance and his many valuable suggestions
in the preparation of this study of mistake in the construction contract.
On the problems of unilateral mistake see also, Note (1926) 26 Col. L.
Rev. 989; Note (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 60; Foulke, Mistake In Forma-
tion and Performance of a Contract, (1911) 11 Col. L. Rev. 197.2 Geremia v. Boyarsky, (1928) 107 Conn. 387, 140 Ad. 749; Stein-
meyer v. Schroeppel, (1907) 226 Ill. 9, 80 N. E. 564; Brown v. Levy,
(1902) 29 Tex. Civ. App. 389, 69 S. W. 255; State v. Scholz Bros., (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928) 4 S. W. (2d) 661.
3C. H. Young Co. v. Springer, (1911) 113 Minn. 382, 129 N. W. 773
(reading Ys inch per foot scale as Y4 inch per foot) ; Southbridge Roofing
Co. v. Providence Cornice Co., (1916) 39 R. 1. 35. 97 Aft. 210 (same);
Leonard v. Howard, (1913) 67 Or. 203, 135 Pac. 549.4 Board of Commissioners v. Bender, (1905) 36 Ind. App. 164, 72
N. E. 154 (omission of a page in the estimate book) ; Board of Regents v.
Cole, (1925) 209 Ky. 761, 273 S. W. 508; Tyra v. Cheney, (1915) 129
Minn. 428, 152 N. W. 835; St. Nicholas Church v. Kropp, (1916) 135
Minn. 115, 160 N. W. 500 (structural iron); Barlow v. Jones, (N.J. Ch.
1913) 87 Atl. 649 (carpentry).5 Moffett, Hodgkins & Clarke Co. v. Rochester, (1900) 178 U. S. 373.
20 Sup. Ct. 957, 44 L. Ed. 1108 ($1.50 per foot of excavation instead of
$15.00 per foot); Bromagin v. City of Bloomington, (1908) 234 I1.
114, 84 N. E. 700 (figure for weight per foot instead of price per foot) ;
City of New York v. Seely-Taylor Co., (1912) 149 App. Div. 98, 133
N. Y. S. 808, aff'd on opinion below, (1913) 208 N. Y. 548 (numbers
wrongly copied); Harper v. City of Newburgh, (1913) 159 App. Div.
695, 145 N. Y. S. 59.
Boeclder Lumber Co. v. Cherokee Realty Co., (1909) 135 Mo.
AnD. 708. 116 S. W 452; City of New York v. Dowd Lumber Co.. (1910)
140 Awn. Div. 358, 125 N. Y. S. 394; Neill v. Midland Ry., (1869) 20
L. T. (N.S.) 864.
7McCormack v. Lynch, (1897) 69 Mo. App. 524 (excavation work
thought to be for a different site).
srudson Structural Steel Co v. Smith & Rumery Co., (1912) 110
Me. 123, 85 At. 384 (bid on the basis of iron and steel for one building
whereas specifications called for two buildings); Grant Marble Co. v.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEII"
remarkable array of errors sufficiently important to have led to
litigation.
In a large number of cases, the mistake was put forward to
obtain the return or cancellation of a deposit check which ac-
companied the bid as security for the execution of the contract
on the acceptance of the bid.9  In others it was set out as a de-
fense to an action for damages on the part of the owner who
had been forced to relet the contract at a higher price on the
refusal of performance by the mistaken bidder."0 Suits to ob-
tain a decree of rescission," or reformation," and actions at
law in quantum meruit for the services performed, ignoring the
price named in the contract,' " comprise the remainder.
The cases are divided rather evenly between granting" and
denying 5 relief.
Abbot, (1910) 142 Wis. 279, 124 N. W. 264 (work demanded for six
stories and bid on the basis of five).9Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Robinson Construction
Co., (1914) 123 Md. 660, 91 At. 682; Bowes v. Town of Milton, (1926)
255 Mass. 228, 151 N. E. 116; Brown v. Levy, (1902) 29 Tex. Civ. App.
389, 69 S. W. 255; Moffett, Hodgkins & Clarke Co. v. Rochester, (1900)
178 U. S. 373, 20 Sup. Ct. 957, 44 L. Ed. 1108; Bromagin v. City of
Bloomington, (1908) 234 Ill. 114, 84 N. E. 700; Board of Commissioners
v. Bender, (1905) 36 Ind. App. 164, 72 N. E. 154; Board of Regents v.
Cole, (1925) 209 Ky 761, 273 S. W. 508; St. Nicholas Church v. Kropp,
(1916) 135 Minn. 115, 160 N. W. 500; Barlow v. Jones, (N.J. Ch. 1913)
87 AtI. 649.
'Bertram v. Bergquist, (1910) 153 I1. App. 43; Geretnia v. Boyarsky,
(1928) 107 Conn. 387, 140 Atl. 749; State v. Scholz Bros., (Tex. Civ.
App. 1928) 4 S. W. (2d) 661; C. H. Young Co. v. Springer, (1911) 113
Minn. 382, 129 N. W. 773; Southbridge Roofing Co. v. Providence Cornice
Co., (1916) 39 R. I. 35, 97 Atl. 210; Leonard v. Howard, (1913) 67 Or.
203, 135 Pac. 549; City of New York v. Seely-Taylor Co., (1912) 149
App. Div. 98, 133 N. Y. S. 809: City of New York v. Dowd Lumber
Co., (1910) 140 App. Div. 358, 125 N. Y. S. 394; McCormack v. Lynch,
(1897) 69 Mo. App. 524.
"Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel. (1907) 226 I1. 9, 80 N. E. 564; Harper
v. City of Newburgh, (1913) 159 App. Div. 695, 145 N. Y. S. 59.
12Youngstown Electric Light Co. v. Poor District, (1902) 21 Pa.
Super. Ct. 96; Neill v. Midland Ry., (1869) 20 L. T. (N.S.) 864.
13Tyra v. Cheney, (1915) 129 Minn. 428, 152 N. W. 835; Boeckler
Lumber Co. v. Cherokee Realty Co., (1909) 135 Mo. App. 708, 116 S. W.
452; Hudson Structural Steel Co. v. Smith & Rumery Co., (1912) 110
Me. 123, 85 Atl. 384; Grant Marble Co. v. Abbot, (1910) 142 Wis, 279,
124 N. W. 264.
14Geremia v. Boyarsky, (1928) 107 Conn. 387, 140 Atd. 749; Board
of Commissioners v. Bender, (1905) 36 Ind. App. 164, 72 N. E. 154:
Board of, Regents v. Cole, (1925) 209 Ky. 761, 273 S. W. 508; Tyra
v. Cheney, (1915) 129 Minn. 428, 152 N. W. 835; St. Nicholas Church
v. Kropp. (1916) 135 Minn. 115, 160 N. W. 500; Barlow v. Jones, (N.J.
Ch. 1913) 87 Atl. 649; thus in every case of omission of an item, relief
was granted; Moffett, Hodgkins & Clarke Co. v. Rochester, (1900) 178
U. S. 373, 20 Sup. Ct. 957, 44 L. Ed. 1108; Bromagin v. City of Bloomington,
(1908) 234 II1. 114, 84 N. E. 700; Harper v. City of Newburgh, (1913)
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A. Impalpable Mistake.-The solution to the problems im-
plicit in this type of case is not easily found. Assuming the mis-
take to be impalpable, or unknown to the other party,"0 the
builder or owner has entered into a valid contract, or has ac-
cepted a low bid and returned the other deposit checks, in reliance
upon an estimate submitted by a person who is presumably com-
petent, and more than likely, expert. If an expectation of per-
formance is ever aroused upon the formation of a contract, this
promisee's expectation has been aroused. To permit the con-
tractor to withdraw from the contract without penalty simply
because he has added a column of figures carelessly, seems hardly
a desirable result.
On the other hand, are we to force a contractor who has made
an honest, though careless blunder, either to pay damages, or to
go through with a contract he never thought he was making?
Are we to require him to perform when all profit is taken from
the transaction and a loss perhaps to be incurred ? Practically, as
every business man knows, a forced performance without profit
and with the possibility of a loss will result in shoddy material
and poor work.
In many cases if the bidder refuses to perform, it will mean
159 App. Div. 695, 145 N. Y. S. 59; City of New York v. Dowd Lumber
Co., (1910) 140 App. Div. 358, 125 N. Y. S. 394; Neill v. Midland Ry..
(1869) 20 L. T. (N.S.) 864; Hudson Structural Steel Co. v. Smith &
Rumery Co., (1912) 110 Me. 123, 85 Ad. 384.
15 Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, (1907) 226 Il. 9, 80 N. E. 564; Bromn
v. Levy, (1902) 29 Tex. Civ. App. 389, 69 S. W. 255; State v. Scholz Bros.,(Tex. Civ. App. 1928) 4 S. W. (2d) 661; C. H. Young Co. v. Springer.
(1911) 113 Minn. 382, 129 N. W. 773; Southbridge Roofing Co. v.
Providence Cornice Co., (1916) 39 R. I. 35, 97 AtI. 210; Leonard v.
Howard, (1913) 67 Or. 203, 135 Pac. 549. All of the cases of misreading
blueprints; City of New York v. Seely-Taylor Co., (1912) 149 App. Div.
98, 133 N. Y. S. 808; (while the city was denied additional damages be-
cause the deposit check represented liquidated damages for the costs of
readvertising, nevertheless the contractor was denied rescission) ; .\cCor-
mack v. Lynch, (1897) 69 Mo. App. 524; Grant Marble Co. v. Abbot.(1910) 142 Wis. 279, 124 N. W. 264; Baltimore v. Robinson, (1914) 123
Md. 660, 91 AtI. 682; Bowes v. Town of Milton, (1926) 255 .Mass. 228,
151 N. E. 116; Bertram v. Bergquist, (1910) 153 Ill. App. 43; Youngs-
town Electric Light Co. v. Poor District, (1902) 21 Pa. Super. Ct. 95.l6To avoid the necessity of repeating the phrases "not known to the
other party" and "known to the other party," Professor Patterson has
employed the words "impalpable" and "palpable" to describe these situa-
tions. It should be noted that the term "palpable" has a broader signifi-
cance than "known" in that it refers to an objective rather than a sub-jective approach. The United States Supreme Coprt has used the term
"palpable" in this connection in Moffett, Hodgkins & Clarke v. Rochester,
(1900) 178 U. S. 373, 386, 20 Sup. Ct. 957, 961, 44 L. Ed. 1108. 1115. Sec
also Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N Y. v. Waugh, (1927) 222 Ky. 198. 201.
300 S. W. 592, 593.
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the forfeiture of his deposit check which may result in a hand-
some but hardly deserved gift to the owner.' 7 To refuse rescis-
sion means forfeiture of the deposit, or damages to be paid the
owner for his loss of bargain. To grant rescission denies com-
pensation to the promisee for his disappointed expectation in a
situation in which he has been free from fault.
In the protection of this expectation of the owner, the courts
have resorted in many instances to the device of calling the con-
tractor negligent. And that seems to have decided the case. The
great difficulty with this method is that it does not offer any
solution to the problem. The desired result having been found,
these courts have resorted to a label, a "vituperative epithet""'
to explain their decision.
A mistake in addition was called negligent in Steiinmeyer v.
Schroeppel,"' a case of impalable mistake in which relief was
denied. In a later case in the same jurisdiction, Broniagin v.
City of Bloomington,20 the plaintiff, bidding on a city contract
for the furnishing and laying of a water main, made a mistake
in carrying over into the column containing the price per foot of
sixteen inch pipe, the figure representing the weight per foot, so
that the bid was considerably less than was intended. The mis-
take was noticed by the city engineer who pointed it out to the
city board before they accepted the bid.2 1  Here the court said
that there was a reasonable excuse for the error. Having thus
distinguished the case before it from the Steinmeyer Case where
the mistake was "negligent," the court granted recission.
It is difficult to see how a mistake on the part of an expert
contractor, or any business man for that matter, in placing a
number in the wrong column is any less negligent than a mistake
in adding that column. It may be that even a school-boy is sup-
posed to be able to add properly, but in doing a careful job, he
should be equally competent in setting down numbers in their
proper place.
In the Steinineyer Case the mistake was impalpable; in the
-7St. Nicholas Church v. Kropp, (1916) 135 Minn. 115, 160 N. W.
500. The deposit check was for a thousand dollars, yet no expense was
incurred by the owner since readvertising was not necessary. It was
the court's distaste for this result that led to the granting of rescission.
sPatterson, Equitable Relief for Unilateral Mistake, (1928) 28 Col.
L. Rev. 859. 885 note 1.
19(1907) 226 I1. 9, 80 N. E. 564.
20(1908) 234 II1. 114, 84 N. E. 700.
2 1The case is, therefore, one of palpable mistake, being known to the
other party.
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Bronzagin Case it was not, and that may well be the basis for
the difference in result.2-' But calling one negligent and the other
reasonable is not deciding anything.
While the court's sympathies may be aroused to favor the
contractor who was ill when he estimated his bid,21 that this fact
should make the mistake any less negligent is untenable. That
there should be a difference in legal result depending on extrinsic
emotional factors would be a definite and undesirable departure
from established doctrine.2 1 If relief is to be denied for impalp-
able mistake, the reason for doing so must be more substantial
than a condonation of the negligent action of the mistaken party.
Another familiar device of the courts found repeatedly in
these mistake cases is the use of the "meeting of the minds"
doctrine. This too is a rationalization. In those cases in which
relief is to be given, the courts find that there was no meeting of
the minds.2 5  But where relief is to be denied, curiously enough
there is a meeting of the minds.20 even though the contractor was
just as mistaken, and despite the fact that had he known of the
mistake the contract would not have been signed, nor the bid
submitted.
Even assuming, contrary to the current of opinion of present
dar writers.2 7 that the meeting of the minds theory does con-
2
-'As a matter of fact the court in the Bromagin Case does stress the
fact that the mistake was known to the board. Nevertheless the two
grounds, the reasonableness of the mistake and the palpability, are the basis
of the decision.2 1n Barlow v. Jones, (N.J. Ch. 1913) 87 Ati. 649, 650. the court
says, "Mr. Barlow was a sick man. His vitality had been sapped, his
nervous system shattered by a diabetic disorder, which later led to partial
paralysis."24Boyden v. Hill. (1908) 198 Mass. 477, 484, 85 N. E. 413, 415,
(evidence as to nhysical condition at the time of executing the contract
held properly excluded) ; Horn v. Davis, (1914) 70 Or. 498, 503, 142 Par.
544. 545.25Geremia v. Boyarsky, (1928) 107 Conn. 387, 140 At. 749; Board
of Commissioners v. Bender, (1905) 36 Ind. App. 164. 72 N. E. 154;
Board of Regents v. Cole, (1925) 209 Ky. 761, 273 S. NN. 508; Tyra v.
Cheney, (1915) 129 MIinn. 428, 152 N. W. 835: St. Nicholas Church v.
Kropp, (1916) 135 Minn. 115, 160 N. W. 500; Moffett. Hodgkin- &
Clarke Co. v. Rochester. (1900) 178 U. S. 373. 20 Sup. Ct. 957. 44 L. IA.
1108; Hudson Structural Steel Co. v. Smith & Rumery Co.. (1912) 110
Me. 123, 85 At. 384.
-eSteinmeyer v. Schroeppel, (1907) 226 Ill. 9. 80 N. E. i6: Bro%%n
v. Levy. (1902) 29 Tex. Civ. App. 389. 69 S. W. 255; Leonard v.
Howard. (1913) 67 Or. 203. 135 Pac. 549: Boeckler Lumber Co. %'.
Cherokee Realty Co.. (1909) 135 Mo. App. 708. 116 S. V. 452; McCor-
mack v. Lynch. (1897) 69 Mo. App. 524; Grant Marble Co. v. Abbot,
(1910) 142 Wis. 279, 124 N. W. 264.27Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy. (1919) 33
Harv. L. Rev. 198, 209-212; Corbin, Offer and Acceptance and Some of
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stitute a valid basis for decision, nevertheless it is unreasonable
to say that in one case of a mistaken bid there is a meeting of the
minds, and in another there is none. If the reason for the lack
of consensus is that the contractor did not intend his mistaken
bid to represent his estimate, that the bid as submitted was not
a correct transcript of a sum already fixed, then the same reason-
ing holds for the cases where relief was denied for a similar type
of mistake. If the reason the minds have met is because the
contract was exactly what each party understood it to be and be-
cause it expressed what was intended by each, 8 that too could
be said of the other cases.
It appears, therefore, that in addition to the fundamental ob-
jections to the doctrine of the meeting of the minds, there is the
further objection here in its inconsistent and illogical application.
Like the use of the term "negligent," it is a rationalization, a
post-decision label, and not a basis for deciding future cases.
An examination of the cases of unilateral impalpable mistake
in construction bids indicates a general tendency to deny relief
to the mistaken contractor, 29 thus following the rule set down
in other types of unilateral impalpable mistake.30 As between the
two hardships, the courts feel that the better result is attained in
protecting the expectations of the owner with whose conduct no
fault can be found. This protection of expectation by denial of
equitable relief thus applies to these cases the considerations used
for the most part in courts of law. Since the merger of law and
equity there is no good reason for contrary methods of approach.
the Resulting Legal Relations, (1916) 26 Yale L. J. 169, 205; 1 Williston,
Contracts, sec. 95.28Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, (1907) 226 I11. 9, 80 N. E. 564.2
9With the exception of Harper v. City of Newburgh, (1913) 159
App. Div. 695, 145 N. Y. S. 59, relief was denied for unilateral impalpable
mistake in the cases cited supra notes 14 and 15.3
°Griffin v. O'Neil, (1892) 48 Kan. 117, 29 Pac. 143 (sale of cattle--
mistake in addition) ; Tatum v. Coast Lumber Co., (1909) 16 Idaho 471,
101 Pac. 957 (sale of machinery--same) ; Scott v. Hall, (1900) 60 N. J.
Eq. 451, 46 Atl. 611 (confusion as to sums due on contracts) ; Farquhar v.
Farquhar, (1907) 194 Mass. 400, 80 N. E. 654 (action for money had and
received for payments under improper calculations) ; Page v. Higgins.
(1889) 150 Mass. 27, 22 N. E. 63 (sale of land-extent of purchase);
Turner v. Washington Realty Co., (1924) 128 S. C. 271, 122 S. E. 768
(purchase at judicial sale-mistake as to senior creditors) ; Olson v.
Shephard, (1926) 165 Minn. 433, 206 N. W. 711 (exchange of lands-
mistaken boundaries) ; Libby, McNeil & Libby v. Bush Terminal Co.,
(1923) 121 Misc. Rep. 228, 201 N. Y. S. 149 (plaintiff forgot a prior con-
tract with the same lessor giving him an option at a lower price) ; Diman
v. Providence, etc., Ry., (1858) 5 R. 1. 130 (subscription for stock-
wrong amount).
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The result of so holding is salutary, the weight of authority is
with it, and law and equity become unified.
St. Nicholas Church v. Kropp" presents a case in which the
court was faced with the occasional hardship incident to the
strict application of any rule of law. The case was clearly one
of impalpable mistake,32 yet to deny relief would be presenting
to the owner a gift of a thousand dollars where he had sustained
no damage. The deposit check for that amount probably stood
as liquidated damages for the cost of readvertising and reletting3
Since a belated bid, considerably lower than that which followed
the defendant's low bid, was accepted, no such expense was in-
curred. The facts are particularly compelling, and the sympathies
of the court were obviously with the contractor. As authority,
however, it is doubtful whether the case will be followed; at most,
its ruling will be limited to the particular facts.
B. Palpable Mistake.-In the case of a palpable mistake,
other considerations face the courts. It may well be argued that
there is no reasonable expectation aroused in the owner when he
knows of the contractor's mistake. Actually there may be grave
doubts in his mind whether the contract will be performed upon
the discovery of the mistake. If it is discovered, as a business
man he knows that the wisest course will be to permit the con-
tractor to withdraw. And if the expectation consists in the wish
that the mistake will not be discovered until performance is com-
pleted, that is a gamble at long odds and not an expectation.'
Regardless of whether or not there is an expectation in fact,
the courts feel that on ethical grounds the promisee should not
be permitted to take advantage of the mistake.35 Business acumen
is respected and the employment of skill in driving shrewd bar-
31(1916) 135 Minn. 115, 160 N. W. 500 (rescission).321nfra note 63.
33City of New York v. Seely-Taylor Co., (1912) 149 App. Div. 98.
133 N. Y. S. 808.34Nor, of course, is such a hope the expectation of performance which
is protected by the courts.
35In Neill v. Mlidland Ry., (1869) 20 L. T. (N.S.) 864, 865, the
court said: "The mistake is so palpable that it seems strange that the
defendant should seek to take advantage of it." Similarly in Geremia v.
Boyarsky. (1928) 107 Conn. 387, 391, 140 At. 749, 750, it is said, "It
would be inequitable under the circumstances to permit the plaintiff, who
had good reason to know [see comment infra p. 145], before the contract
was signed, that there must have been a substantial omission or error in
the amount of the bid, to take advantage of such error while the con-
tract was still executory, and he had been in no way prejudiced, and to
require the defendants to do the work for an amount much less than
the actual cost."
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gains is upheld, but the ability to take advantage of a mistake
requires little more than a hard conscience and is not encouraged
by the courts. This aversion to "snapping up" a bargain, coupled
with the fact that there may be no expectation worthy of protec-
tion, have led to the holding in a large majority of the cases of
mistaken construction bids' 6 that relief will be granted where the
mistake is palpable. 3 7
In most cases, therefore, the question of relief turns upon the
3
"All of the cases in which relief was granted, supra note 14, are
cases of unilateral palpable mistake, with the exception of Harper v.
City of Newburgh, (1913) 159 App. Div. 695, 145 N. Y. S. 59, and St.
Nicholas Church v. Kropp, (1916) 135 Minn. 115, 160 N. W. 500. Among
the cases in which relief was denied, supra note 15, Baltimore v. Robinson
Construction Co., (1914) 123 Md. 660, 91 AtI. 682, is the only case of
palpable mistake. In that case there was a state statute for the city
of Baltimore declaring all bids to be irrevocable when filed. But the
presence of a similar statute (lid not bother the court in Moffett. etc.
v. Rochester, (1900) 178 U. S. 373, 386, 20 Sup. Ct. 957, 961, 44 L. Ed.
1108. 1115. There the Supreme Court, in holding that because of the mistake
there was no bid capable of being revoked, quotes with approval the
opinion of the circuit court where it was said, "if the defendants are
correct in their contention, there is absolutely no redress for a bidder for
public work, no matter how aggravated or palpable his blunder. The
moment his proposal is opened by the executive board lie is held as in
a grip of steel. There is no remedy, no escape. If, through an error of
his clerk, he has agreed to do work worth a million dollars for ten dollars,
he must be held to the strict letter of his contract, while equity stands
by with folded hands and sees him driven to bankruptcy."
The Maryland court distinguishes the Moffett Case on the ground that
it was in equity while the case before it was an action at law. But
quaere, whether this is a valid distinction. Cf. Tyra v. Cheney, (1915)
129 Minn. 428, 152 N. V. 835, an action at law.
-It seems to be the general rule that relief will be given for unilateral
palable mistake. Galloway v. Russ. (1927) 175 Ark. 659. 300 S. V. 390
(mistake as to type of refrigerator purchased); Skelton & Co. v. H'lli%.
(1883) 70 Ga. 297 (mistake on ticket rate sheet according to which sales
were made); Morgan v. Owens, (1907) 228 I11. 598, 81 N. E. 1135
(misunderstanding of the extent of a release) ; Jones v. Chicago. 13. & Q.
R. R., (1918) 102 Neb. 853, 170 N. W. 170 (shipment of merchandise to
the wrong party); Chute v. Quincy, (1892) 156 Mass. 189, 30 N. E.
550 (specific performance denied; error on the plans in sale of land)
Nelson v. Pederson, (1922) 305 II1. 606, 137 N. E. 486 (purchase of
wrong lot) ; Moore v. Copp. (1897) 119 Cal. 429, 51 Pac. 630 (plaintiff
thought the deed she gave was only an option to lease) ; Crosby v.
Andrews, (1911) 61 Fla. 554, 55 So. 57 (excessive conveyance) ; Retan v.
Clark. (1922) 220 Mich. 493. 190 N. W. 244 (reformation; omission of
part of the consideration) ; Town of Essex v. Day, (1885) 52 Conn. 483
(option clause omitted on bonds) : Bell v. Carroll, (1925) 212 Ky. 231.
278 S. W. 541 (stock to be sold at "par" ($100.), meaning "market price"
($300) : Everson & Co. v. International Granite Co.. (1893) 65 Vt. 058.
27 Aft. 320 (mistake in the price of monuments; error in computation)
Freeman v. Croom. (1916) 172 N. C. 524, 90 S. E. 523 (mortgage claim
on which automobile released invalid because of late registration) ; Frazer
v. State Bank of Decatur, (1911) 101 Ark. 135. 141 S. W. 941 (accep-
tance of one note signed by a company, the bank thinking it another in-
strument making the directors individually liable.
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palpability of the mistake. Consequently, it becomes highly im-
portant to consider under what circumstances a mistake does
become palpable. Of course, actual knowledge of the mistake
brings the case within the field. But as a matter of proof, this is
likely to be very difficult.
With the public bid, where the executive board is assembled
when the bid is opened, notice of the mistake by the city engineer
or by some member of the board may often be proved. But in the
case of the private bid, proof of actual knowledge is unusual. It
may be that in an unguarded moment, or in a burst of confidence,
the owner -will confess his knowledge and good fortune to one
who will later testify, but such a situation .is most unlikely.
Palpability must, therefore, be a matter of inference. The
court must assume from the facts, from the discrepancies of the
bids, from the experience qf the owner or contractor, that he
knew of the mistake. In the light of the decided cases, this
seems to be the position which has been adopted.
In Gerenia v. Boyarsky8 it nowhere appears that the owner,
the plaintiff, actually knew of the mistake. Both the plaintiff and
the defendant were sitting together at a table when the de-
fendant added his numbers and made the error. If the plaintiff
had admitted observing the mistake, there is little doubt that the
court would have mentioned it. What the court does say is:
"The plaintiff, when the erroneous bid was given and when he
procured the signing of the contract, had good reason to believe
and know that there must have been a substantial omission or error
in the amount of the bid."
It should be noted that the court does not say simply that the
plaintiff must have known that there was an error in the amount
of the bid, but that he had good reason to believe that there was
an omission or error. From the facts of the case it is apparent
that he was not an expert relying on his own knowledge. That
he was aware of the error can only follow from the presence
of other bids or estimates, or else be an inference by the court
that since it would have known there was a mistake, the owner
must have known of it. But unless a sufficient background is
before the court, this inference must be a matter of guesswork.
It is for the purpose of suggesting the content of such a back-
ground that this article has been written.
38(1928) 107 Conn. 387, 389, 140 At. 749, 750.
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Hudson Structural Steel Co. v. Smith & Rumery Co? pre-
sents another case of imputed knowledge. There the plaintiff's
mistake was in construing the specifications to call for iron and
steel for one roofing, whereas the demand was for two. A
similar mistake had been called to the defendant's attention by
another contractor. In setting aside the contract and granting
the plaintiff's recovery in quantum meruit, the court quotes from
the referee's report,
" 'I find, in view of the fact that the defendant had knowledge
before executing the contract that at least one other contractor
had misinterpreted the plans and specifications as to the number
of buildings, and in view of the smallness of the amount for
which plaintiff proposed to furnish the steel roof framing (it
being many hundred dollars less than the actual cost to furnish
roof framing for two buildings) that the defendant, an experienced
contractor and bidder on contracts embracing iron and steel struc-
tural work, ought to have been put upon inquiry as to whether
the plaintiff was not acting under a mistake as to the number of
the buildings.' It is the opinion of the court that this finding
should be sustained."
The two words "actual cost" as used in the report are inter-
esting. If they have any significance in relation to the promisee's
thoughts when the contract was made, it must be on the basis
of other bids or estimates than known to the promisee. No find-
ing of actual knowledge of the mistake is shown, but the court
grants recission on the ground that from the extremely low bid,
the defendant as an expert contractor should have detected the
mistake.
In Barlow v. Jones40 the plaintiff submitted five alternative
bids covering various shaped buildings. There should have been
seven subcontractors' estimates included to produce the plaintiff's
totals. Through an oversight, one of the subcontractor's bids
was omitted in three of the five alternative proposals. The
court, in cancelling the contract and ordering the return of the
deposit check, said: "The amount named in the bid was a manifest
mistake." The contemporaneous circumstances from which the
court inferred that the defendant was actually aware of the
mistake do not appear in the report.
Dicta by the courts in other cases point to the same con-
clusion.
39(1912) 110 Me. 123, 125, 85 Atd. 384, 385.
40(N.J. Ch. 1913) 87 Atil. 649, 650.
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"It seems impossible for the error to have escaped the notice
of the board." 4' "If by reason of ambiguity in the terms of the
contract, or some peculiar circumstances surrounding the trans-
action, it appears that one of the parties has, without gross fault
or laches on his part, made a mistake, that this mistake was
known, or ought to have been known, to the opposite party, the
court will afford relief."4 2  "There is no such discrepancy be-
tween the bid submitted and the next higher bid as would justify
us in saying, as a matter of law, the plaintiff was thereby put upon
notice that Howard had made a mistake."'2
From these cases it is quite clear that the palpability of a
mistake which will be the ground for relief to the mistaken
party may be inferred by the court from the fact that the
promisee should have known or must have known of the mistake
where it does not appear as a matter of fact that he actually did.
This inference is drawn largely because the contractor's bid was
so low in comparison with the other bids submitted or even with
the owner's implicit estimate that a reasonably experienced busi-
ness man would suspect that a mistake had been made. This
owner, being that reasonably experienced business man, con-
sequently must have known (i.e., probably did know) of the
mistake.
The result of this approach is clearly conducive to a higher
ethical standard in business operations. If the skilled contractor
will be held to have known of a subcontractors' mistake, fewer
contracts based upon an erroneous bid will be signed. The courts
will have discouraged successfully the "snapping up" of another's
mistake.
II. IN BUSINESS PRACTICE
If palpability is to be a matter of inference, it becomes highly
desirable to study the situations from which that supposition will
be raised. When does the experienced contractor suspect that a
mistake has been made in the estimate submitted to him? How
low must the low bid be to put him on notice? What is the usual
variation in bids offered in the usual course of business? The
answers to these questions may be found in a comparison and
41Moffett Hodgkins & Clarke Co. v. Rochester, (1900) 178 U. S.
373, 387, 20 Sup. Ct. 957, 962, 44 L. Ed. 1108, 1115.
42City of New York v. Dowd Lumber Co., (1910) 140 App. Div.
358, 362, 125 N. Y. S. 394, 397, quoting Singer v. Grand Rapids Match
Co., (1903) 117 Ga. 86, 94, 43 S. E. 755, 757.
42 Leonard v. Howard, (1913) 67 Or. 203, 212, 135 Pac. 549. 552.
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study of bids which have been submitted to builders and munici-
palities in the regular conduct of their affairs. From these
figures may be evolved a more or less scientific method of analyz-
ing tie cases which have already come before the courts, and
of approaching new cases with a view to conformity with busi-
ness practice and uniformity of legal result.
A. The Causes of Variation.-Under the modern industrial
system, it would be expected that the bids on a particular piece
of work would vary but little. The job calls for very definite
construction; there is scarcely any opportunity for individuality
of expression. At any particular time lumber will cost so much,
and brick so much, and steel so much. Labor, too, is a cost with
small variation. Accordingly, if specifications are sent to sub-
contractors for bids on steel construction, since the price of steel
should be fairly equal for all bidders, and labor charges precisely
the same in view of the unionization of the workers, the bids
submitted should fall within a close range. There are, however,
numerous other considerations which complicate the problem.
Over a representative group of companies to whom the specifi-
cations for a particular job will be given, organization of the
business enterprise will differ. Some will be large, firms, doing
a great volume of business, able to buy in large quantities, and
with great available resources. Others will be small units, han-
dling a few operations yearly, eager to establish a reputation.
Still others may be financially weak, opearting desperately to stage
a comeback, speculating, perhaps, on a lower price of materials
at the time of the performance of the contract. All of these
factors may be reflected in the bid.
In the case of a large firm, ability to make heavy purchases
brings with it an opportunity to take discounts. As a result,
this company's bid may be considerably lower than those of other
organizations. On the other hand, being an established enterprise
with a recognized retlutation, handling as much business as it can
take conveniently, its bid may be considerably higher. The con-
sumer is accustomed to pay for quality. This company feels that
it will have to be paid well to undertake another transaction. It
may even be that it positively cannot handle the work, yet being
obliged to bid as a matter of policy, an estimate is submitted
knowingly placed too high.
Another firm may be doing very little work. Its offices, its
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men, its machinery represent a constantly mounting item of over-
head. Unless it secures the contract, the costs will continue to
rise. This company will be satisfied to make a very small profit
on the contract just so long as it can move into operation.
A small company, newly established. may be angling for the
contract as a matter of advertising. If it can complete a few
well known jobs, even if they be done at a small profit, its
reputation is established. Consequently, this organization's bid
will be low. So too, with the company which is financially tin-
stable; it may be a matter of vital importance to it that it obtain
the work.
But despite the influences of these economic factors on the
bids submitted, there is a range of variation into which all bids
will fall. Of course the variation will be greater than it would
be if these factors were not present. The variation, for example,
may be as high as 30% for a bid of a certain size. whereas under
other circumstances it might not be more than 5-. But once
it is established that bids for that size contract vary to the extent
of 30%, any bid in that class which varies 50%c or more demands
investigation. for clearly a mistake of some kind has been made.
It was with a view to establishing the normal range of variation
in several classes of bids that the tabulations contained in the
appendix were organized.
B. Analysis of Bids.-Two types of bids have been collected:
subcontractor's bids to a private contractor for materials and
labor for the erection of a twelve story bank and office building, a
fifteen story apartment house, and a seven story garage; and
bids submitted by contractors to the board of transportation of
New York City for public work. Both sets of bids cover a period
ranging from August to November. 1930.
In the computation 44 of the percentage variation of the low
bid. two methods have been employed. By one. the differences
between the lowest bids and the average of all bids are stated as
percentages of the average of the bids submnitted for a certain
p'iece of work. In the other the difference between the low bid
and the next higher is stated as a percentage of the low bid
itself. The use of both methods is desirable so that one may
stand as a check against the other in certain unusual cases.
44The writer wishes to express his appreciation to Messrs. H. A.
Inghram and R. P. Eastwood of the Columbia School of Business for
their helpful suggestions as to the handling of the statistical material.
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In the first method the dollar amount of the bids for a par-
ticular job are averaged. The low bid and the next higher bid
are then each subtracted from the average. Dividing the re-
mainder in each case by the average, a percentage is obtained.
The result thus far constitutes a percentage representing the varia-
tion of the low bid from the average, and the next to the low
from the average. The second percentage may then be sub-
tracted from the first to produce a third percentage for purposes
of analysis.
To illustrate, if we take the first set of bidss in the board of
transportation group, that for enclosures at a station, it may be
seen that they vary from $3,202.00 to $8,065.00, tile last being
considerably higher than the others. The average of tie eleven
bids is $4.315.45. The difference between the low bid and tie
average is $1,113.45, and that of the next higher and average is
$515.45. Taken as percentages, the variation of the low bid
from the average of bids is 23%, and the variation of the next
lowest is 11%. The difference between the two variations is, of
course, 12%.
The second method was made necessary in order to compare
the results of these bids with the cases which have been ad-
judicated. In the cases, unfortunately, the complete set of bids
is not in any instance set out. In a number of the cases, no
figures at all are shown ;46 in others only the mistaken bid and
what it should have been are given. 47  A comparison with these
cases is impossible.
But in some cases the court does give the low bid and the
next higher bid. By reducing these figures to percentages they
may then be compared with like percentages in the collected bids.
Accordingly. a percentage has been derived by taking the differ-
ence bet-ween the low and the next higher bid on the low bid.
In the set of bids used for illustration above, the difference is
$598.00 which yields 12% if taken on the low bid, $3,202.00.48
4Slnfra, p. 157, no. 1.
40Tyra v. Cheney, (1915) 129 Minn. 428, 152 N. W. 835: Scholz
Bros., (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) 4 S. W. (2d) 661.
47Geremia v. Boyarsky, (1928) 107 Conn. 387, 140 Atl. 749; Barlow
v. Jones, (N.J. Ch. 1913) 87 Atl. 649.
4SThe use of the first method described will prove valuable where both
the low bid and the next higher are considerably lower than the remainder
of the bids. It is conceivable that both are mistakes. Accordingly a per-
centage taken on the average bid will show the discrepancy, whereas a
percentage of the difference between the two lows taken on the low would
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An examination of the tabulations of percentages"" indicates
a definite trend. As the dollar size of a contract increases, the
percentage of variation decreases.- When the bid is in the low
thousands, the percentage variation taken on the average is as
high as 32% in the public work bids and 21% in the private bids.
Using the percentage variation on the low bid, for public work
it is as high as 20%, and in private bids, 48%. As the sums
mount into the hundred thousands, the variations decrease gener-
ally. In the millions, the highest variation under both methods
is 6%. Reference to the tabulations will fix the variations for
specific sums; an extended discussion and elaboration of them
here is unnecessary.
It may be said, therefore, that where the bid is in the thousands.
a fairly high percentage of variation is expected; one between
30% and 50% is usual. Consequently a low bid which varies to
that extent is anticipated by the expert contractor or builder. But
a bid with a greater percentage of variation is highly unusual. If a
mistake is shown in such a bid, the court will be well justified in
calling it a palpable mistake.
With the dollar increase, as has been shown, the percentage
variations decrease, so that a much smaller degree of variation
may constitute warning of a mistake. It will be noticed that in
the case of the public work bids ranging in averages from
$111,640.00 to $367,074.00, the largest variation, using the second
method, is, with one exception, 5%. That one exception, a
not An exact example is not at hand, but in the set of bids for telephone
and emergency alarm, infra, p. 157, no. 3, it will be seen that the variation is
more clearly discernible with the use of the first method than with the
second. If the two lows were closer, only the first method would show
the discrepancy.
On the other hand, where the high bid or bids are extremely high, as
for river borings, infra p. 157, no. 2, the average is thrown off. and the
low bid, while not varying greatly from most of the bids. will vary
considerably from the average. In that case the second method would be
more desirable. It seems, therefore, that both methods should be used to
arrive at an accurate conclusion.
49Infra pp. 156-159. Because of the comparative incompleteness
of the private bids, the results are not so reliable as those from the
public estimates. Unfortunately, the private bids presented were the only
ones available. In many instances only two bids on a job were submitted
and many subcontractor's items are not represented. This, of course.
does not lend itself to so complete an analysis as in the case of a list of
bids. Then too, the private bids at their highest in dollar amounts are
equivalent to the lower public bids. Consequently they may only show
how high the variations for the lower amounts will run. Despite these
handicaps, however, all the bids are presented, since it is felt that with
them certain general tendencies may be demonstrated.
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14% variation on the bids for telephone and emergency alarms,
provides an excellent and most gratifying practical application
of the theory which the writer has attempted to develop. Ac-
cording to the rule set out, that bid because of its high relative
variation should give notice of a mistake. As a matter of fact,
the low bid in that group was not accepted. The whole set of
bids was thrown out by the board of transportation and the work
readvertised.
C. Application to the Adjudicated Cawes.-When it comes
to the application of these principles to the reported cases of
unilateral mistake in construction contracts, uniformity of result
cannot be expected. The courts have followed no definite rule.
Palpability, where knowledge in fact was not shown, has been a
matter of judicial guesswork, and often a matter of sympathy.
Nevertheless, the cases do support the view that an extraordinary
variation will make the mistake palpable.
In Moffett. Hodqkins & Clarke Co. v. Rochester--" rescission
was granted. Using the second method outlined above since the
complete set of bids is not available, the percentage variation on
the low is 31%. In view of the fact that the low bid was for
S857.552.00. this was- an extremely high variation t and would
he proper cause for calling the mistake palpable.
The court in Board of Commissioners v. Bender 2 granted
relief to the plaintiff who sought to have the contract rescinded
and his deposit check returned, on the ground that the plaintiff
was not negligent and that the minds of the parties had not met.
To the plaintiff's contention that the defendant should have
known of the mistake, the court ineptly answered. "Although
the plaintiff alleges the difference was so great the defendant
should have known, this does not show the mistake to be mutual."
Nevertheless the court (lid reach the proper result in granting
rescission since the percentage variation was 27% on a lov bid
of $11.337.00. considerably higher than the normal variation.53
On the reverse side of the picture. relief was denied in
Blowes v. Town of Hlilton"' where the variation was 9% on a
--0(1900) 178 U. S. 373, 20 Sup. Ct. 957, 44 L. Ed. 1108. L.ow hid,
$857,552.00; next higher, $1,130,195.00.
-Sllnfra Table I, p. 156. this being the table on public work.
,2(1905) 36 Ind. App. 164, 72 N. E. 154. Low hid, $11,337.00: ,next
higher. $14.500.00.
5 3 lnfra Table I, p. 156.
5 4(1926) 255 Mass. 228, 151 N. E. 116. Low bid, $201,784.00; next
higher, $221,784.00.
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bid of $201,784.00. This is somewhat higher than is indicated
in the tabulation, but not so much higher as to warrant calling
it a palpable mistake. Being impalpable, relief was properly
denied.
Another case of impalpable mistake is Boeckler Lumber Co.
v. Cherokee Realty Co.,5' where the variation was 13% on a low
bid of $1,960.00, clearly within the variation for a bid of that
amount. On the same sort of work the variation was 307 in
Steiineyer v. Schroeppel'6 and relief was denied. According to
Table 11157 a variation as high as 47% may be expected. Some
doubt, however, may be cast on the Steinneyer Case in that the
bid was for lumber only, and not for materials and labor as in the
estimates which are used in the collected bids. It may well be
that in such a situation the variation should be considerably lower,
more like the Boeckler Case. But to establish this, extensive re-
search beyond the scope of this article would be necessary."
Relief was likewise denied in Brown v. Levy' where the
variation was 18% on a low bid of $64,000.00 for private work.
The decision agrees rather closely with the private bid variations
of Table IV."° Leonard v. Howard"' presents a variation of
37% on $4,975.00, rather high, but within Table III.1 Relief
was denied.6 '
55(1909) 135 Mo. App. 708, 116 S. W. 452. Low bid, $1,960.00; next
higher, $2,230.00.56(1907) 226 Il1. 9, 80 N. E. 564. Low bid, $1,446.00, other bids in
the neighborhood of $1,890.00.
5 Infra, p. 159. This is the only table containing a percentage on
approximately this amount.581n this connection it might be well to observe that non-standardized
work will be subject to greater variations than the ordinary routine job.
But even in such a situation, an extreme bid should call for an investiga-
tion to corroborate the estimate. If no inquiry is made a court would
be justified in holding as palpable any mistake made in that bid.
59(1902) 29 Tex. Civ. App. 389. 69 S. W. 255. Low bid, $64,000.00:
next lowest, $76,000.00.6Onfra, p. 159.
1(1913) 67 Or. 203, 135 Pac. 549. Low bid, $4,975.00; next higher,
$6,827.00.62 nfra, p. 159.63In the remaining cases which present sufficient material, the re-
sults are as follows: Bromagin v. City of Bloomington, (1908) 234 11.
114, 84 N. E. 700, low bid $25,567.02, next lowest bid, over $29,000.00, a
variation of 13%, normal according to Table I; Board of Regents v.
Cole, (1925) 209 Ky. 761, 273 S. W. 508, low bid $207,787.00, next bid
$238.787.00, variation of 14%. an abnormal variance. But in both cases
there was other proof of notice of the mistake by the board, so that
reference to tables to infer notice becomes unnecessary. Relief wa.
granted in both cases. St. Nicholas Church v. Kropp, (1916) 135 Minn.
115, 160 N. W. 500, low bid $30,973.00. next higher $34.873.00, a variation
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These cases demonstrate that where the variation is greater
than is to be expected in bids of that size, relief will be granted,
but where the variation is normal, relief will be refused. By the
use of tables similar to those set out in the appendix, the usual
variation for any particular size of construction contract may be
determined.
There is little doubt that evidence of a normal variation
and departure would be admissible in a particular case. In prac-
tically all of the cases of mistake which have been considered,
evidence to prove the mistake and knowledge on the part of the
owner has been admitted. If palpability is to be a matter of in-
ference from what the reasonable man would expect, it must
follow that evidence showing what the reasonable man normally
expects is proper.
1II. CONCLUSION
Some comment should be made concerning the attitude of the
contractor in respect to erroneous bids. Generally, in the case
of a private contract, if the mistake is large, the company or
individual to whom the bid is submitted will release the mistaken
party from his obligation. It is felt that this is a wise and
cautious policy. A subcontractor forced to perform at a loss or
with slight profit will undoubtedly skimp on the job in order to
salvage something from the ruins. Either workmanship or ma-
terial, and perhaps both, will prove unsatisfactory.
Large firms, on the other hand, upon discovering a mistake
in their bids to other concerns, often prefer to say nothing of the
matter, completing the work according to contract. This is found
to be necessary to uphold their reputations and maintain the good
will of owners and contractors.
In the case of the public bid, it is the policy of the board
of transportation of New York City to permit a withdrawal by
the contractor despite the fact that readvertising will be necessary.
This, of course, is countenanced only when the contractor has
convinced the board that he has made a mistake and that it was
honest. Over the past few years, this procedure has been re-
sorted to but twice. Law suits are extremely rare.
of 12%, normal under Tables II, III, IV, which are the summaries for
private bids. The mistake was therefore impalpable. The result may be
explained. however, on the facts of the case.
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I Mistakes in the bids submitted to the board of transportation
are minimized by the use of a form book into which all bids must
be entered. Having made his own calculations, the contractor
sets down in the booklet the price per unit at which he is willing
to perform the work together with the number of units required.
The extension and addition is done by the board itself. Under
this system most of the mistakes which have been brought before
the courts are eliminated.6 4
In the light of these practices, it is highly probable that litiga-
tion involving mistaken bids is on the decline. Where it does
arise, however, relief should be denied in case of unilateral im-
palpable mistake, and granted where the mistake is palpable.
Under this rule protection will be afforded the expectation of
641n studying an estimate book of this type, the lawyer must be
careful not to be misled by the great discrepancies among the individual
items; the books are reliable only for the totals they present. It is the
practice among contractors to 'unbalance' their bids. (See City of New
York v. Dowd Lumber Co., (1910) 140 App. Div. 358, 125 N. Y. S. 394).
An accurate total, based on exact computations, is estimated for the
contractor's own information and guidance. The individual items are
then unbalanced.
It may be that a contractor foresees difficulty in financing the
proposition. If that is the case, he will increase the cost of the earlier
work and decrease that of the work at the end of the job. Since payments.
as the job progresses, are made on the basis of the previously stated value of
the work, by this device he will have collected his 80% (or whatever the
contract provides) on a greater amount than his cost, thus freeing him
from the worry of final payments.
Another reason for unbalancing is the possibility of extras. The
specifications as set by the city are often extremely rough. Accordingly,
a contractor will find that on some items, such as cement work, there will
be a number of unforeseen extras for which no additional compensation
can be asked. To provide for these the bid will be unbalanced, i.e.. made
proportionately higher with respect to those items.
With the aid of a blueprint elaboration of each bid, as prepared by
the board of transportation, the large discrepancies among individual items
as compared with the totals can easily be seen. Taking the group of bids
for Station Finish "A" infra p. 158, no. 4, it will be seen that the variation
of the totals, using the second method, is only .2%. But the detailed
items making up those bids, such as earth excavation, rock excavation.
removal and disposal of old masonry, and waterproofing show, by the
same method, variations of 33%, 25%, 35%, 25%, and the like for the
hundred and thirty-six items of the bid.
These figures demonstrate that the estimate book is to be used with
care, and that for purposes of comparison, only the totals can be used
accurately. They are, further, a demonstration that estimates generally
are not to be separated into their component parts as a basis for fixing
damages for partial performance of building contracts. See Patterson,
Builder's Measure of Recovery for Breach of Contract, (1931) 31 Col.
L. Rev. 1286, 1303. "Of course, if the specifications stipulate that any item
in the bid may be accepted, the contractor will see to it that none of his
bid is unbalanced.
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the promisee in accordance with the established doctrine of the
courts of law and equity.
Much of the harshness which may be involved in the strict
protection of this expectation will be minimized by the granting
of relief in the case of a palpable mistake. The more serious the
blunder, so that denial of relief would bring about a hardship, the
more likely it is that the mistake will cause the bid to vary outside
of the normal variation of bids in that class. Palpability being a
matter of inference, the abnormal variation will prove the mistake
palpable, and judicial relief will be granted the mistaken promisor.
APPENDIX
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF PERCENTAGE VARIATION OF BIDS SUBMITTED TO TIIE BOARD
OF TRANSPORTATION OF NEW YORK CITY, AUGUST 2 9TIT To NOVEMDER 14 T11,
1930, ON PU13LIC WORK
>q > .
Enclosures at Station ...... $ 4,315.45 23. 11. 12. 12.
Removal of Columns ........ 8,028.40 32. 19. 13. 19.
Boring Vehicular Tunnel.. 12,869.37 20. 11.9- 8.1 10.
Untreated Ties .................. 20,217.01 9. 5.5 3.5 3.
Malleable Iron .................... 23,896.73 2.7 1.8 .9 .8
River Borings ................ 29,816.87 40. 31. 9. 15.
Belts, Nuts, Washers ...... 33,213.63 3.5 2.8 .7 .7
Steel W ork ........................ 46,794.37 3.8 1.9 1.9 1.
Spikes .................................. 57,691.40 1.8 .7 1.1 2.
Joint Bars .......................... 70,680.05 1.9 1.9 3.8 4.
Widening Roadway .......... 92,318.29 22. 3. 19. 24.
Treated Ties ...................... 111,640.29 8.4 6. 2.4 2.
Tie Plates ............................ 117,231.92 1.8 1.8 3.6 3.
Station Lighting ................ 140,416.00 9.6 5.2 4.4 4.
Track Installation ............ 253,261.60 10. 6. 4. 4.
Passageway ........................ 296,758.82 15. 10. 5. 5.
Duct Line ............................ 298,735.87 2.9 .05 2.85 3.
Station Finish "A" . ......... 348,358.27 2. 1.8 .2 .2
Station Finish .................... 351,827.45 4.1 3. 1.1 1.
Telephone Alarm .............. 364,345.80 34. 25. 9. 14.
Station Finish "B" . ........... 367,074.97 4. .7 3.3 3.2
Power Equipment ............ 2,183,205.40 2.3 2.3 4.6 4.
Block Signaling ................ 2,237,750.00 2.1 2.1 4.2 5.
Queens Boulevard "A" .... 5,555,485.12 6. .6 5.4 5.
Queens Boulevard "B" .... 5,669,813.87 6. .3 5.7 6.
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-Space limitations prohibit the setting out in full of the various bids
submitted on each contract. In all, there are fifty-three groups, each
represented in the Tables by the average bid of that group and percentages.
Four sets of bids are here presented in order to show typically how the
estimates on a contract vary, and to indicate the methods employed in
reducing the bids for purpose of analysis.6 6For explanation, see supra, p. 150.
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SUMMARY OF PERCENTAGE VARIATION OF BIDS SUBMITTED BY SUBCON-




to Z3C3 C3C 3 3
Concrete Steel ................ $ 669.66 7. 1.7 5.3 5.
Toilet Partitions .............. 3,208.50 17. 1.2 15.8 19.
Roofing and Sheet Metal 3,703.00 8.1 3.3 4.8 5.
Ornamental Iron 7,009.66 1.35 1.34 .01 .01
Terra Cotta ........................ 8,090.00 12. .1 11.9 14.
Tiling ............................... 8,61025 17. 16. 1. 1.
Cement Flooring ............ 9,366.00 5.8 2.4 3.4 3.
Glazing ............................... 10,750.00 5.1 5.1 102 10.
Casements ............................ 17,598.00 2.2 22 4.4 4.
Marble ........ 18,274.00 15. 9. 6. 6.
Bronze ................................ 21,244.00 25  15. 10. 13.
Hollow Metal .................. 47,334.50 15. 15. 30. 36.
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$ 7,231.27
6,394.52
--MISTAKE IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
TABLE III
SUMMARY OF PERCENTAGE VARIATION OF BIDS SUBMITTED BY SUBCON-
TRACTORS ON A PRIVATE SEVEN STORY GARAGE, AUGUST, 1930.
Z
K$. g
r= > >l !C
Finishing Hardware .. $ 372.50 19. 19. 38. 46.
Granite 1,132.50 19. 19. 38. 47.
Electrical Work _.---------. 3,303.00 14. 1.9 12.1 13.
Sheet Metal 3,733.00 10. 10. 20. 2.
Windows 4,856.00 1.2 1.2 00 00
Ornamental Iron . 4,993.33 1.8 .2 1.6 1.
Plumbing . 5,338.50 21. 11. 10. 12.
Sprinklers -.------------ 7,675.00 2.3 2.3 4.6 4.
Elevator .................. 14,960.00 16. 16. 32. 40.
Arches ........................... 25,750.00 10. 10. 20. 23.
Structural Steel ............... 36,648.00 8.7 3.4 5.3 5.
TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF PERCENTAGE VARIATION OF BIDS SUBMITTED BY SUBCON-
TRACTORS ON A PRIVATE FIFTEEN STORY APARTMENT HOUSF.
SEPTEMBER, 1930
> C 0
Fireproof Doors .. ............ .... $16,456.00 2.7 2.7 SA 5.
Carpentry .. ......... 20,850.00 6.2 6.2 12.4 13.
Elevators .. . .... ..... ...... ........ 31,342.50 4.9 4.9 9.8 10.
Concrete Arches .................... 57,873.00 8.8 8.8 17.6 19.
Structural Steel ...................... 78,745.00 .3 .3 .6 .6
